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COMMENTS
WATER: STATEWIDE OR LOCAL CONCERN?

City of

Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Colorado, through its state constitution,' delegates to home
rule municipalities' powers of the broadest possible scope.' City
of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.' was before
the Colorado Supreme Court for a decision on the constitutionality of the then recently enacted Condemnation of Water Rights
Act 5 as applied to home rule cities and towns.' Justice Groves for
the majority held as unconstitutional provisions of the Condemnation of Water Rights Act concerning the determination of necessity to acquire water rights. The basis for this determination
was that the Act's procedures conflicted with the enumeration of
powers delegated by the state constitution to home rule municipalities.7 Justice Erickson, joined by Justice Carrigan in dissent,
COLO. CONST. art. XX, §§ 1-9 (1902, § 6 amended 1912, §§ 2, 5 amended 1950, § 9
amended 1970).
, The Colorado Municipal League reports that there were 54 home rule cities and
towns in Colorado as of 1978. COLORADO MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, DIRECTORY OF MUNICIPAL AND
COUNTY OFFICIALS IN COLOADO 41 (1978).
3 Toll v. City & County of Denver, 139 Colo. 462, 340 P.2d 862 (1959); Fishel v. City
& County of Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d 236 (1940). See generally J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN (3d. ed. 1976); Klemme, The Powers of Home Rule Cities in Colorado
36 U. COLO. L. REv. 321 (1964).
575 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1978).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to -216 (Supp. 1976).
Although the parties requested a determination as to whether the Condemnation
of Water Rights Act was unconstitutional on its face, the court ruled only relative to home
rule cities. 575 P.2d at 387. See generally R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS (1967);
Gross, Condemnation of Water Rights for Preferred Uses-A Replacement for Prior
Appropriation?, 3 WILLAMETrE L. J. 263 (1965); Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596 (1954); Thomas, Appropriations of
Water for a PreferredPurpose, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 422 (1950); Trelease, Preferences to
the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 133 (1955); Note, A Survey of Colorado Water
Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226 (1970).
575 P.2d at 388. Article XX, section 6, of the constitution provides home rule cities
and towns with all powers available to the City and County of Denver by § 1. The
pertinent part of § 1 provides:
[home rule cities and towns] shall have the power, within or without
[their] territorial limits, to construct, condemn and purchase, purchase,
acquire, lease, add to, maintain, conduct and operate, water works, light
plants, power plants, transportation systems, heating plants, and any other
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would have held the condemnation of water rights to be a matter
of statewide concern, and thus outside the jurisdictional sphere
of home rule cities and proper for state legislative control.'
II.

CITY OF THORNTON

v.

FARMERS RESERVOIR AND IRRIGATION CO.

Thornton is within the expanding northern metropolitan
area of Denver, Colorado. To meet the needs of its increasing
population, Thornton, through its utilities board,9 determined
the necessity of acquiring new supplies of water.' 0 In early 1973
Thornton made an offer to Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.
(FRICO), a mutual ditch company," to purchase its Standley
Lake Division.'" The offer was not accepted' 3 and in November,
public utilities or works or ways local in use and extent, in whole or in part,
and everything required therefore, for the use of said [home rule city or
town] and the inhabitants thereof, and any such systems, plants or works
or ways, or any contracts in relation or connection with either, that may exist
and which said [home rule city or town] may desire to purchase in whole
or in part, the same or any part thereof may be purchased by said [home
rule city or townl which may enforce such purchase by proceeding at law as
in taking land for public use by right of eminent domain ....
COLO. CONST. art. XX § 1 (1902).
575 P.2d at 393.
THORNTON Crry, COLO., CHARTER, § 201(b) (1967) provides:
The City shall have all the power of self-government and home rule and all
power possible for a city to have, under the Constitution of the State of
Colorado. The City shall also have all powers that now or hereafter may be
granted to municipalities by the laws of the State of Colorado ....
Section 1607 of the Charter provides the city with the power to acquire "within or without
its corporate limits . . . water, water rights and water storage rights . . . and may take
the same upon paying just compensation to the owner as provided by law." The City
Utilities Board by § 507(d) has the following powers:
Subject to the limitations contained in this Charter, the Board shall have
and exercise all powers of the City of Thornton granted by the Constitution
and the laws of the State of Colorado and by this Charter including, but not
limited to the following powers; powers to . . .condemn . . . water and
sewer utilities . . . and everything necessary, pertaining, or incidental
thereto ....
" Brief for Appellant Thornton at 9.
A mutual ditch company in Colorado is a nonprofit corporation organized under
special statutes for ditch and reservoir companies. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 742-101 to -117
(1973). For a thorough analysis of mutual ditch companies, see Jacobucci v. District Ct.,
189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975).
11 Standley Lake is one of four similar divisions of FRICO. Brief for Appellee FRICO
at 1.
13Thornton made a presentation at the FRICO annual stockholders meeting. Thornton, voting its own shares, made a motion to accept the offer. The motion was tabled. This
meeting followed a series of letters and discussions with FRICO management. Brief for
Appellant Thornton at 13-15.
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1973, Thornton commenced condemnation proceedings in the
District Court of Jefferson County, Colorado."
The Standley Lake Division of FRICO diverts waters .from
streams in Boulder and Jefferson Counties for storage in the Standley Lake reservoir located in Jefferson County.'5 The water is
carried by canal through Thornton to irrigate 10,000 to 15,000
acres of farmland operated by the FRICO division stockholders"
in Adams and Weld Counties.
Soon after Thornton began proceedings against FRICO, the
FRICO Standley Lake Division stockholders sought intervention
as indispensable parties. The district court denied intervention in
January, 1975.11 Thereafter the stockholders brought an original
action in the Colorado Supreme Court demanding joinder. In
Jacobucci v. District Court,'8 a unanimous court opinion delivered in September, 1975, by Justice Erickson held that the more
than 270 Standley Lake Division shareholders were indispensable
parties to Thornton's proceedings against FRICO.'5 The court
held that the shareholders were to be joined in the action if the
district court could find that Thornton satisfied the requirement
of failure to agree on compensation to be paid for the rights
sought to be taken.20
" Thornton had originally filed in October, but withdrew and filed again after the
offer to FRICO was rejected at the stockholders meeting. Brief for Appellant at 15. The
Condemnation of Water Rights Act would require Thornton to file in the district court in
the district in which it is located-Adams County. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-6-202 (Supp.
1976). However, the court did not decide the issue. 575 P.2d at 392.
,5 Brief for Appellee FRICO at 2-6. "Towns and cities are everywhere empowered by
either statute or state constitution to condemn private water rights to secure water for
public or domestic uses." C. MARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF NATURAL
RESOURCES 144 (1951).
When no extraterritorial power of eminent domain is expressly granted to a
municipality . . . [alnd in view of the strong policy consideration for allowing a municipality to obtain a water supply for its inhabitants, it is not
surprising that, by the weight of authority, an extraterritorial power of eminent domain is implied either from the power to purchase property outside
the city, or from the power to condemn a water supply within the city.
R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 304.3 (1967).
" Brief for Appellee FRICO at 2-6.
' The court's theory for refusal to admit the shareholders was that FRICO is the
owner of record and acting as trustee for the shareholders. Brief for Appellee Jacobucci at
2-3.
" 541 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1975).
" Although recognizing authority for the trustee theory (supra note 17), the court held
that the rights of the stockholders were in the rights to receive the water and were so
particularized as to require joinder. 541 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1975).
0 The failure to agree provision appeared in an amendment to the original opinion
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Three months before the supreme court decision in Jacobucci
the Condemnation of Water Rights Act became effective. Evidently Thornton believed that because condemnation was already in progress the Act was not applicable to it retroactively.
The city simply divided the previous offer to FRICO by the number of shares in the Standley Lake Division and forwarded it to
the stockholders. 2 ' Only a few stockholders accepted the offer.
Subsequently the others were joined in the proceeding. After
joinder in March, 1976, various stockholders made motions for
summary judgment or dismissal based on Thornton's failure to
follow the provisions of the Condemnation of Water Rights Act
relative to the new parties. The trial court found Thornton would
have satisfied all the requirements necessary for joinder under the
law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Condemnation of
Water Rights Act.22 However, the new act was found to control 2 3
and Thornton's failure to follow its provisions required dismissal
as to the stockholders, thus also requiring a dismissal as to
FRICO.2' Thornton appealed, contending mainly that the new
procedures were unconstitutional as applied to Colorado's home
5
rule municipalities.
III.

CONDEMNATION STATUTES

Prior to the enactment of the Condemnation of Water Rights
Act, a city or town, whether home rule or statutory, 6 could have
proceeded fairly simply in a typical condemnation proceeding
against water rights for public use. In Colorado there are two
general condemnation statutes,' both of which establish procedural rules for the exercise of eminent domain.2 8 As to home rule
cities and towns, the differences are important only for efficiency,
in Jacobucci.Brief for Appellee Jacobucci at 2 and appendix A.
" The original offer was $9,300,000.00. The per share offer was $3,920.00. Brief for
Appellant at 17. Brief for Appellee Jacobucci at 5. This equal per share value fails to
account for the historical application of each individual shareholder. Baker v. City of
Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 289 P. 603 (1930); White v. Nuckolls, 49 Colo. 170, 112 P. 329 (1910).
2 575 P.2d at 386-87.
Id. at 387.
24 If the shareholders could not be joined, under Jacobucci the action as to FRICO
had to be dismissed. Id.
Id. at 386.
'e Exercise of Municipal Powers-Water and Water Systems, COLO. REV. STAT. § 3115-708 (1977). See aLso COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 31-35-102 (1977), 38-6-101, -122 (1973).
21 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-101 to -120, 38-6-101 to -122 (1973).
2 See COLO. CONST. art. II, §§ 14, 15 (1902).
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and a home rule municipality may proceed under whichever it
considers appropriate for its needs."
The general procedure of either of these two statutes is for
the condemnor to determine the necessity of the taking and attempt to agree with the owner on compensation." Formal negotiations with the owner need not take place and a simple offer by
mail has been held to be sufficient. 3 ' If there is a failure to agree
or accept the offer the condemnor may proceed in district court
32
to determine compensation.
In both statutes the determination of the necessity of acquiring the property is left to the condemnors and may not be reviewed by the court absent a showing of fraud or bad faith.u The
inseparability of condemnation and the determination of necessity is supported by overwhelming authority 35 and is usually based
on the obvious notion that necessity, or what is the public need,
is a legislative or political question central to the concept of condemnation. 6 However, it has been pointed out that a legislative
determination can only be scrutinized against a constitution and
in most states the constitution provides nothing upon which a
court may base any opposition to a statute or ordinance determining necessity. 7 Whenever the power to condemn is delegated
by the sovereign, necessity is for the delegee to decide, otherwise
there would be no power delegated.Y
The Condemnation of Water Rights Act attempted to re11City of Englewood v. Wesit, 184 Colo. 325, 520 P.2d 120 (1974); Toll v. City & Co.
of Denver, 139 Colo. 462, 340 P.2d 862 (1959).
3o COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-102 (1973).
11Interstate Trust Bldg. Co. v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 172 Colo. 427, 473
P.2d 978 (1970).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-102, -6-102 (1973). See CoLo. CONST. art. II, §§ 15, 19
(1902).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-102(1), -6-105 (1973).
31 Colorado State Bd. of Land Comm'rs. v. District Court, 163 Colo. 338, 430 P.2d
617 (1967); Wassenich v. City & Court of Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533 (1919). "The
court has no power to inquire into the necessity of exercising the power of eminent domain
for the purpose proposed, nor into the necessity of making the proposed improvement, nor
into the necessity of taking the particular property described in the petitions." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-6-105 (1973). The only powers conferred upon the courts in the other condemnation statute is determination of compensation. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-1-102 (1973).
J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11 (3d ed. 1975).
Id. at § 4.11(1).
37Id.
Id. at § 4.11(3)(2). A few states require necessity to be reviewed judicially in special
circumstances; e.g.. Michigan, Montana, New York. Id. at § 4.11(4).
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move the right to determine necessity from a city wishing to
condemn and vest it in a special commission. 3 FRICO and amici
curiae argued that the changes were merely procedural and did
not affect Thornton's substantive rights to condemn.40
The Condemnation of Water Rights Act requires that:
(1) The condemning city must file a petition with the district
court outlining the improvements and requesting the appointment of a three member commission to make a determination as
to necessity and compensation for taking.4 ' The petition is restricted to consideration of needs not in excess of fifteen years.4 '
(2) The city must submit to the commission a community
43
growth plan and detailed statement of the project.
(3) The city must join all owners of property to be condemned or who would be damaged."
(4) There must be a hearing before the commission on the
petition and the city must serve a summons on all defendants
who must be allowed to appear and be heard."
(5) The commissioners are to report one of the following:
(a) There exists no need and necessity for condemnation
as proposed.
(b) There exists a need and necessity for condemnation
as proposed.
(c) There exists a need and necessity for condemnation,
6
but it is premature.4
(6) A hearing on the report is to be held before the district
court with all defendants again having to be served a summons
by the city and all defendants again being allowed to be heard.41
(7) The court will give a final report which includes a review
of the "determination of necessity.48
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-6-202 (Supp. 1976).

40Brief for Appellee FRICO at 22. Brief for Amicus Curiae Colorado Farm Bureau,
at 8-14.
!

COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-6-202(1)

Id.
'3 Id.
" Id.
,5 Id.
,6 Id.
41Id.
" Id.
42

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

§ 202(2).
§ 203.
§ 204.
§ 205.
§ 207.
§ 210.
§§ 210, 214.

(Supp. 1976).
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With the above provisions the Condemnation of Water
Rights Act neuters eminent domain by striking at its basis in
sovereignty and necessarily at the constitutional delegation of
eminent domain to home rule cities by the sovereign-the people
of Colorado. The Condemnation of Water Rights Act substitutes
a temporary commission for the responsibility of elected officials
to determine the needs of the people. Although the opinion of the
court does not refer to it, Thornton and amici curiae argued that
a state legislative delegation of authority to determine necessity
was a delegation of municipal business to a nonelected special
commission in violation of article V, section 35 and article XXI,
section 4 of the state constitution. 9 As mentioned above, what is
necessary is more a political question than anything else and
should be decided by political representatives.s
IV. HOME RULE CITIES
Traditionally the powers of home rule cities have been limited to those necessary to control matters of purely local or municipal concern."' When these concerns are the subject matter of
"' Brief for Appellant Thornton at 29. "The general assembly shall not delegate to
any special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make, supervise
or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held
in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever." COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 35.
Every person having authority to exercise or exercising any public or
governmental duty, power or function, shall be an elective officer, or one
appointed, drawn or designated in accordance with law by an elective officer
or officers, or by some board, commission, person or persons legally appointed by an elective officer or officers, each of which said elective officers
shall be subject to the recall provision of this constitution ...
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or limiting the
present or future powers of cities and counties or cities having charters
adopted under the authority given by the constitution, except as in the last
three preceding paragraphs expressed.
COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 4 (1912). It has been suggested in a novel hypothesis that the
exercise of extraterritorial powers denies equal voting rights to affected nonresidents under
the authority of the voting rights issues in the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. 45 U. CHICAGO L. REv. 151 (1977).
10See note 36 supra.
11It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of
all municipalities coming within its provisions the full right of selfgovernment in both local and municipal matters and the enumeration herein
of certain powers shall not be construed to deny such cities and towns, and
to the people thereof, any right or power essential or proper to the full
exercise of such right.
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (1902, amended 1912). See generally DILLON, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 92 (5th ed. 1911); supra note 3.
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provisions of home rule city charters or ordinances, such provisions will usually supersede any state statute in conflict,,2 Although the concept of supersession is clear, the problem has been
to determine what is a local or municipal concern. 5 The Colorado
Supreme Court has yet to set down an adequate test as to what
is a local matter and admits the difficulty of dealing with the constant flux of the various factors to be considered. 5 However, the
court has made it clear that the mere appearance of a provision
in a home rule city charter or ordinance in conflict with a state
statute does not preclude inquiry into the question of which controls.55
The power of a Colorado home rule city or town to condemn
and purchase water works within or without its borders is enumerated in the state constitution 5 and reiterated in the Charter
of the City of Thornton.5 7 Neither Thornton nor amici curiae
argued, nor did the court decide, whether water is a statewide
concern. Both instead relied heavily on a supremacy argument,
i.e., specific enumerations in the constitution prevail over general
statements in the constitution and conflicting statutes or cases. 5
In the 1913 case of People ex rel. Tate v. Prevost5 the court was
12 Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdictions of
said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as applicable, shall continue
to apply to such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
CoLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. See note 51 supra.
13 City & County of Denver v. Pike, 140 Colo. 17, 342 P.2d 688 (1959); City & County
of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958); People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202,
110 P.2d 256 (1941). Of particular interest is Denver v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co.,
67 Colo. 225, 184 P. 604 (1919), overruled by People v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co.,
125 Colo. 167, 243 P.2d 397 (1952), the latter holding that utility rates were a statewide
concern.
" See cases cited supra note 53.
"Id.
" See note 7 supra.
5? See note 9 supra.
u 575 P.2d at 389.
All respondents assert that water rights or condemnation of water rights
are matters of statewide concern and that therefore the Colorado Legislature
has exclusive jurisdiction to enact laws covering those subjects. Whether or
not matters of statewide concern are involved, the Legislature has no power
to enact any law which denies a right granted by the Colorado Constitution.
Reply Brief for Appellant Thornton at 11. Thus, Thornton argued that the statewide/local
determination needs to be made only when the delegation of authority is not specific.
" 55 Colo. 199, 134 P. 129 (1913).
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asked to respond to a pattern of arguments similar to those in
Thornton v. FRICO. The claim in Prevost was that the Home
Rule Amendment enumeration of powers to control municipal
elections and to assess property taxes did not relate to matters of
local or municipal concern. Without making a value judgment on
the claim the court replied that these subjects,
are declared local and municipal matters, and they have been so
declared by the people themselves. If they were not so before the
amendment, they are so now, in the towns and cities of the state
having two thousand inhabitants, whose people elect to be governed
under their own charter. 0

Unfortunately, the supremacy argument does not reach the important question of whether water in Colorado is a statewide or
local concern.
V.

WATER:

STATEWIDE OR LOCAL CONCERN?

Whether water is a statewide or local concern is a complicated political paradox and as with other political questions is
probably not a subject for the courts but rather for the people of
Colorado to decide. The obvious solution to the delegation of the
power of eminent domain over water rights to home rule cities is
to invoke the political process for amending the constitution."
However, it is too simplistic to base changes in water administration on the mere statement that water is an overwhelming statewide concern. It is misleading to point to sections of the constitution, to legislative policy of statutes, or to cases which start off,
"The water of every natural stream . . . is hereby declared to be
the property of the public . . .,,11 or, "[in this dry and arid
region, a right to the use of water appropriated for beneficial
0 55 Colo. at 215, 134 P. at 134.
" City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958). Such an

amendment was proposed in the 1978 Colorado General Assembly. The pertinent section
of the proposed amendment which has been postponed indefinitely is as follows:
The taking of water rights by eminent domain pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall be subject to such limitations,
procedures, requirements, and prohibitions, including limitations as to the
necessity for such taking, as may be prescribed by the general assembly.
Such limitations, procedures, requirements, and prohibitions shall be those
specified in part 2 of article 6 of title 38, Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, as
amended, in the form existing on January 1, 1979, unless and until modified
thereafter by the general assembly.
H.R. Concurrent Resolution 1006, 51st Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess., HOUSE J., Apr. 23,
1978.
2 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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purposes is of great value .... ,"13 It is misleading because these
sections, statutes, or cases after such pronouncements then proceed to discuss authority which has been delegated to local concerns. The consistent statewide legislative policy regarding water
appears to be to delegate to local bodies or agencies all significant
authority to deal with the problems. Certainly water is not a
statewide concern in the same sense as liquor licenses, commercial transactions, motor vehicle operation, or public utilities.6 4
Each water problem has unique geographical, environmental,
social, and political considerations which must be balanced.
Water is a statewide matter, but the state's way of dealing with
it is to make it a local matter.
The Condemnation of Water Rights Act is supposedly the
latest assertion of statewide water policy. In fact, nearly the opposite is true. Nowhere in the statute is it said that the appointed
commission must consider the impact of the proposed improvement on the state as a whole. Only the effects of the proposed
condemnation on the county and suitable river basin area need
be considered within the "detailed statement." 5 Only the condemnor and owner of property taken or damaged participate in
the inquiry by the commission." The "community growth plan"
as its title indicates, is a report on local matters. 7 At only one
point in the Condemnation of Water Rights Act procedure is it
mentioned that there may be participation by "any interested
party" other than those directly affected, and that participation
is after the initial hearing and recommendation by the commission."
Even with the scope of the inquiry limited as it is, it would
be tremendously expensive to draw up community growth plans
and detailed statements, particularly for small towns. Thornton,
for example, would have had to draw up an impact statement for
at least four counties6 ' and three drainage basins, including that
0 Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426-27, 94 P. 339,
340 (1908).
" See cases cited note 53 supra.
" COLO. Rav. STAT. § 38-6-203 (Penn. Supp. 1976).
" Id. at § 206(1).
'7 Id. at § 203(1)(a).
' Id. at § 210.
n Adams, Boulder, Jefferson, and Weld Counties would be included, because the
FRICO system goes through all four. Brief for Appellee FRICO at 2-6.
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of the South Platte River.70 Recalling that the Condemnation of
Water Rights Act is presumably still effective relative to nonhome rule cities and towns, 7 a qualified town should be encouraged to become a home rule municipality prior to commencement
of any expansion of its water system, thereby avoiding the act's
expensive procedures. Such a result places the burden on the
smallest towns which do not qualify for home rule status.7" These
towns are the least able to afford the expense and have the least
significant quantitative impact on available water supplies. The
result is that the most localized communities bear the burdens of
a program implemented to deal with a statewide concern.
The qualifications of the commissioners appointed under the
Condemnation of Water Rights Act are also based on an overriding awareness that the matter is a local concern. One commissioner is from the condemning municipality, one is from the area
affected, and the third is a disinterested party,7 3 not a representative of statewide interests.
With these thoughts in mind, it is hard to accept an argument that the Condemnation of Water Rights Act is an implementation of statewide policy in the sense that it should supersede a constitutional delegation of authority to home rule
municipalities. The Condemnation of Water Rights Act is itself
a delegation to local authority. Nor does it seem a valid argument
that the shift of the determination of necessity to a special commission is to a body that would be more responsible than elected
officials. This seems particularly true in light of article V, section
35 of the state constitution, the ability of a party to get review
of necessity by showing bad faith on the part of the city,7" and the
whole concept of representative government.
Other examples of similar delegations in Colorado with respect to condemnation of water rights are in the statutes concern"0 Clear Creek and South Boulder Creek would also be included. Id. Peculiarly, the
basins included in the detailed statement do not need to be feeders of the irrigation
system. CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 38-6-203(1)(b)(H) (Supp. 1976).
575 P.2d at 387.
7' Essentially any town with a population of 2,000 may qualify for home rule status.
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (1902, amended 1912).
7' COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-7-202(1). (Supp. 1976).
, See supra note 49.
7' See supra note 34.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 56

ing water districts,7" drainage districts,7 river basin authorities,78
sanitation districts,7 underground water management districts,80
rights of way for irrigation ditches, 81 county commissioners' powers to set water rates82 (also in the constitution) ,8 county court
jurisdiction over ditch damage, 4 and the power of statutory cities
and towns to condemn and purchase water works within or without their boundaries."
The provisions in the Colorado Constitution beyond the
home rule amendments can also be interpreted as constructing
the framework for delegation of authority to local concerns. Article XVI, section 5 has been held to establish the rule of priority
of appropriation as distinguished from the doctrine of riparian
rights. 6 By diversion to a beneficial use, which is a matter of local
law, 7 the right to use the water vests in the appropriator8 8 on a
first in time, first in right basis." It may be argued that riparian
rights are more local by nature than are rights by appropriation,
but riparian rights are necessarily local relative to the natural
stream bed, whereas appropriation is local relative to the location
of the individual appropriator and his beneficial use. The difference is geographical. That an individual with a senior right to
water by appropriation may take his share for beneficial use regardless of whether there is enough in a dry season for junior
appropriators is an odd manifestation of a pronounced statewide
" COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 32-4-101 to
77 Id. at §§ 37-20-101 to -33-101.

-547. (1973 and Supp. 1975).

" Id. at §§ 37-93-101 to -108.

n Id. at §§ 37-4-101 to -547.
0 Id. at §§ 37-90-101 to -141.
s COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 (1902); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-86-104 (1973).
8' COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 37-85-103 (1973).

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (1902).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-89-102, -104 (1973).
a Id. at § 31-15-708.
, Colorado has a system of prior appropriation for beneficial use to detemine water
rights priority and subsequent distribution. The system, since its inception, has been
generally based upon the concept of first in time, first in right. Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). This general rule is subject to modification by the Colorado
Constitution which provides "those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the
preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. See note 6 supra.
17 Snyder v. Colorado Gold Dredging Co., 181 F.62 (8th Cir. 1910); Cascade Town Co.
v. Empire Water and Power Co., 181 F. 1011 (D. Colo. 1910).
0 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
" See note 86 supra.
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concern with water, particularly when there is no attempt to set
a hierarchy of beneficial uses0 other than that which appears in
article XVI, section 6, of the Colorado Constitution.
Article XVI, section 6, of the constitution very generally sets
priorities for water use in the order of domestic, agricultural, and
manufacturing." Since all significant amounts of water in Colorado have been appropriated, article XVI, section 6, has been
held effective only in establishing the right to condemnation of
water for domestic purposes. 2 Condemnation and the determination of necessity, as mentioned above, 3 are local political matters, hence, the application of article XVI, section 6, is also local.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Water in an arid region has substantial emotional appeal, 9
but Colorado cannot afford to allow this to obscure the history
and complex nature of water systems. Nor should it be ignored
that agriculture uses approximately 95% of the water available in
Colorado 5 and any impact on the state as a whole because of
municipal condemnation would be slight. The above arguments
serve the purpose of pointing out that it is by no means the case
that water is nor could be a purely statewide matter. Water problems are a mixture of state, local, and individual concerns.
Thornton has no more power to condemn water rights than
3

See Carlson, Report to Governor John A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law

Problems, 50 DEN. L.J. 293 (1973).
" See note 86 supra.
2 Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 279 P. 44 (1929); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908). See Carlson, supra note 90, at 310.
" See notes 35-38 and accompanying text supra.
94 See, e.g., "The great twentieth century conflict between agriculture and urban life
.
... Brief for Appellee Jacobucci at 20.
95

COLORADO WATER USE
WATER WITHDRAWALS FROM SUPPLY
USE

PUBLIC SUPPLY
RURAL

1970 ACRE FEET

PERCENT OF TOTAL

459,000
45,000

2.7%
.3%

IRRIGATION

15,876,000

94.7%

INDUSTRY
TOTAL

393,000
16,773,000

2.3%
100.0%

213,074

1.3%

DENVER

From the United States Geological Survey, reprinted in CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION IN
COLORADO, WATER LAW FOR THE NON-SPECIALIST PRACTITIONER 1 app. (1977).
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many special districts in Colorado." FRICO and its Standley
Lake Division shareholders on the other hand have no more claim
than any other owners facing loss of property by condemnation.
Any change in water rights condemnation for implementation of
a statewide plan, whether statutory or constitutional, will have
to be far more comprehensive and farsighted than the Condemnation of Water Rights Act's focus on cities and towns, particularly
in light of the lesson learned from the ruling in City of Thornton
v. FarmersReservoir and IrrigationCo. and the resultant burden
on Colorado's smallest towns.' 7 Any change in the delegation of
powers to home rule cities will have to be done by those responsible for the delegation-the people of Colorado.
Jeffrey Herm
" See notes 76-85 supra.
"

See note 72 and accompanying text supra.

